Sunday, June 11, 1865

On leave with my family.

My thoughts on the war:
Mail facilities should be kept up with an army if possible, that officers and men may receive and send letters to their friends, thus maintaining the home influence of infinite assistance to discipline. Newspaper correspondents with an army, as a rule, are mischievous. They are the world’s gossips, pick up and retail the camp scandal, and gradually drift to the headquarters of some general, who finds it easier to make reputation at home than with his own corps or division. They are also tempted to prophesy events and state facts which, to an enemy, reveal a purpose in time to guard against it. Moreover, they are always bound to see facts colored by the partisan or political character of their own patrons, and thus bring army officers into the political controversies of the day, which are always mischievous and wrong. Yet, so greedy are the people at large for war news, that it is doubtful whether any army commander can exclude all reporters, without bringing down on himself a clamor that may imperil his own safety. Time and moderation must bring a just solution to this modern difficulty.

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Saturday, June 10, 1865

On leave with my family.

My thoughts on the war:
I believe that every general who has handled armies in battle most recall from his own experience the intensity of thought on some similar occasion, when by a single command he had given the finishing stroke to some complicated action; but to me recurs another thought that is worthy of record, and may encourage others who are to follow us in our profession. I never saw the rear of an army engaged in battle but I feared that some calamity had happened at the front the apparent confusion, broken wagons, crippled horses, men lying about dead and maimed, parties hastening to and fro in seeming disorder, and a general apprehension of something dreadful about to ensue; all these signs, however, lessened as I neared the front, and there the contrast was complete–perfect order, men and horses– full of confidence, and it was not unusual for general hilarity, laughing, and cheering. Although cannon might be firing, the musketry clattering, and the enemy’s shot hitting close, there reigned a general feeling of strength and security that bore a marked contrast to the bloody signs that had drifted rapidly to the rear; therefore, for comfort and safety, I surely would rather be at the front than the rear line of battle. So also on the march, the head of a column moves on steadily, while the rear is alternately halting and then rushing forward to close up the gap; and all sorts of rumors, especially the worst, float back to the rear. Old troops invariably deem it a special privilege to be in the front –to be at the “head of column”–because experience has taught them that it is the easiest and most comfortable place, and danger only adds zest and stimulus to this fact.
The hardest task in war is to lie in support of some position or battery, under fire without the privilege of returning it; or to guard some train left in the rear, within hearing but out of danger; or to provide for the wounded and dead of some corps which is too busy ahead to care for its own.

To be at the head of a strong column of troops, in the execution of some task that requires brain, is the highest pleasure of war–a grim one and terrible, but which leaves on the mind and memory the strongest mark; to detect the weak point of an enemy’s line; to break through with vehemence and thus lead to victory; or to discover some key- point and hold it with tenacity; or to do some other distinct act which is afterward recognized as the real cause of success. These all become matters that are never forgotten. Other great difficulties, experienced by every general, are to measure truly the thousand-and-one reports that come to him in the midst of conflict; to preserve a clear and well-defined purpose at every instant of time, and to cause all efforts to converge to that end.

To do these things he must know perfectly the strength and quality of each part of his own army, as well as that of his opponent, and must be where he can personally see and observe with his own eyes, and judge with his own mind. No man can properly command an army from the rear, he must be “at its front;” and when a detachment is made, the commander thereof should be informed of the object to be accomplished, and left as free as possible to execute it in his own way; and when an army is divided up into several parts, the superior should always attend that one which he regards as most important. Some men think that modern armies may be so regulated that a general can sit in an office and play on his several columns as on the keys of a piano; this is a fearful mistake. The directing mind must be at the very head of the army–must be seen there, and the effect of his mind and personal energy must be felt by every officer and man present with it, to secure the best results. Every attempt to make war easy and safe will result in humiliation and disaster.

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Friday, June 9, 1865

On leave with my family.

My thoughts on the war:
With us, today, the law and regulations are that, no matter what may be the emergency, the commanding general in Texas, New Mexico, and the remote frontiers, cannot draw from the arsenals a pistol-cartridge, or any sort of ordnance-stores, without first procuring an order of the Secretary of War in Washington. The commanding general–though intrusted with the lives of his soldiers and with the safety of a frontier in a condition of chronic war–cannot touch or be trusted with ordnance-stores or property, and that is declared to be the law! Every officer of the old army remembers how, in 1861, we were hampered with the old blue army regulations, which tied our hands, and that to do any thing positive and necessary we had to tear it all to pieces–cut the red-tape, as it was called, a dangerous thing for an army to do, for it was calculated to bring the law and authority into contempt; but war was upon us, and overwhelming necessity overrides all law.

Congress controls the great questions of war and peace, makes all laws for the creation and government of armies, and votes the necessary supplies, leaving to the President to execute and apply these laws, especially the harder task of limiting the expenditure of public money to the amount of the annual appropriations. The executive power is further subdivided into the seven great departments, and to the Secretary of War is confided the general care of the military establishment, and his powers are further subdivided into ten distinct and separate bureaus.

The chiefs of these bureaus are under the immediate orders of the Secretary of War, who, through them, in fact commands the army from “his office,” but cannot do so “in the field”–an absurdity in military if not civil law.

The subordinates of these staff-corps and departments are selected and chosen from the army itself, or fresh from West Point, and too commonly construe themselves into the elite, as made of better clay than the common soldier. Thus they separate themselves more and more from their comrades of the line, and in process of time realize the condition of that old officer of artillery who thought the army would be a delightful place for a gentleman if it were not for the damned soldier; or, better still, the conclusion of the young lord in “Henry IV.,” who told Harry Percy (Hotspur) that “but for these vile guns he would himself have been a soldier.” This is all wrong; utterly at variance with our democratic form of government and of universal experience. Now that the French, from whom we had copied the system, have utterly “proscribed” it, I hope that our Congress will follow suit. I admit, in its fullest force, the strength of the maxim that the civil law should be superior to the military in time of peace; that the army should be at all times subject to the direct control of Congress; and I assert that, from the formation of our Government to the present day, the Regular Army has set the highest example of obedience to law and authority; but, for the very reason that our army is comparatively so very small, I hold that it should be the best possible, organized and governed on true military principles, and that in time of peace we should preserve the “habits and usages of war,” so that, when war does come, we may not again be compelled to suffer the disgrace, confusion, and disorder of 1861.

The commanding officers of divisions, departments, and posts, should have the amplest powers, not only to command their troops, but all the stores designed for their use, and the officers of the staff necessary to administer them, within the area of their command; and then with fairness they could be held to the most perfect responsibility. The President and Secretary of War can command the army quite as well through these generals as through the subordinate staff-officers. Of course, the Secretary would, as now, distribute the funds according to the appropriation bills, and reserve to himself the absolute control and supervision of the larger arsenals and depots of supply. The error lies in the law, or in the judicial interpretation thereof, and no code of army regulations can be made that meets the case, until Congress, like the French Corps Legislatif, utterly annihilates and “proscribes” the old law and the system which has grown up under it.

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Thursday, June 8, 1865

On leave with my family.

My thoughts on the war:
In relation to guards, pickets, and vedettes, I doubt if any discoveries or improvements were made during our war, or in any of the modern wars in Europe. These precautions vary with the nature of the country and the situation of each army. When advancing or retreating in line of battle, the usual skirmish-line constitutes the picket-line, and may have “reserves,” but usually the main line of battle constitutes the reserve; and in this connection I will state that the recent innovation introduced into the new infantry tactics by General Upton is admirable, for by it each regiment, brigade, and division deployed, sends forward as “skirmishers” the one man of each set of fours, to cover its own front, and these can be recalled or reenforced at pleasure by the bugle-signal.

For flank-guards and rear-guards, one or more companies should be detached under their own officers, instead of making up the guard by detailing men from the several companies.

For regimental or camp guards, the details should be made according to existing army regulations; and all the guards should be posted early in the evening, so as to afford each sentinel or vedette a chance to study his ground before it becomes too dark.

In like manner as to the staff. The more intimately it comes into contact with the troops, the more useful and valuable it becomes. The almost entire separation of the staff from the line, as now practised by us, and hitherto by the French, has proved mischievous, and the great retinues of staff-officers with which some of our earlier generals began the war were simply ridiculous. I don’t believe in a chief of staff at all, and any general commanding an army, corps, or division, that has a staff-officer who professes to know more than his chief, is to be pitied. Each regiment should have a competent adjutant, quartermaster, and commissary, with two or three medical officers. Each brigade commander should have the same staff, with the addition of a couple of young aides-de-camp, habitually selected from the subalterns of the brigade, who should be good riders, and intelligent enough to give and explain the orders of their general.

The same staff will answer for a division. The general in command of a separate army, and of a corps d’armee, should have the same professional assistance, with two or more good engineers, and his adjutant-general should exercise all the functions usually ascribed to a chief of staff, viz., he should possess the ability to comprehend the scope of operations, and to make verbally and in writing all the orders and details necessary to carry into effect the views of his general, as well as to keep the returns and records of events for the information of the next higher authority, and for history. A bulky staff implies a division of responsibility, slowness of action, and indecision, whereas a small staff implies activity and concentration of purpose. The smallness of General Grant’s staff throughout the civil war forms the best model for future imitation. So of tents, officers furniture, etc., etc. In real war these should all be discarded, and an army is efficient for action and motion exactly in the inverse ratio of its impediments. Tents should be omitted altogether, save one to a regiment for an office, and a few for the division hospital. Officers should be content with a tent fly, improvising poles and shelter out of bushes. The tents d’abri, or shelter-tent, carried by the soldier himself, is all-sufficient. Officers should never seek for houses, but share the condition of their men.

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Wednesday, June 7, 1865

On leave with my family.

My thoughts on the war:
Engineer troops attached to an army are habitually employed in supervising the construction of forts or field works of a nature more permanent than the lines need by the troops in motion, and in repairing roads and making bridges. I had several regiments of this kind that were most useful, but as a rule we used the infantry, or employed parties of freedmen, who worked on the trenches at night while the soldiers slept, and these in turn rested by day. Habitually the repair of the railroad and its bridges was committed to hired laborers, like the English navies, under the supervision of Colonel W. W. Wright, a railroad-engineer, who was in the military service at the time, and his successful labors were frequently referred to in the official reports of the campaign.

For the passage of rivers, each army corps had a pontoon-train with a detachment of engineers, and, on reaching a river, the leading infantry division was charged with the labor of putting it down. Generally the single pontoon-train could provide for nine hundred feet of bridge, which sufficed; but when the rivers were very wide two such trains would be brought together, or the single train was supplemented by a trestle- bridge, or bridges made on crib-work, out of timber found near the place. The pontoons in general use were skeleton frames, made with a hinge, so as to fold back and constitute a wagon-body. In this same wagon were carried the cotton canvas cover, the anchor and chains, and a due proportion of the balks, cheeses, and lashings. All the troops became very familiar with their mechanism and use, and we were rarely delayed by reason of a river, however broad. On the whole, I would prefer the skeleton frame and canvas cover to any style of pontoon that I have ever seen.

General Halleck Protests My Report:

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE JAMES, Richmond, Va., June 7, 1865.
Honorable E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War:

SIR: I have just received the Army and Navy Gazette of May 30, containing an official publication of Major-General Sherman’s letters of May 9 and 26, with other papers on the same subject, parts of which had been previously published in the newspapers. In these letters my official conduct which are incorrect and entirely unjustified by the facts of the case.

First. He charges that I encroached upon his military command by directing a portion of my troops to march upon Greensborough in North Carolina. By direction of the President, I was on the 19th of April last assigned to the “command of the Military Division of the James, which included such parts of North Carolina as was not occupied by the command of Major-General Sherman. ” At the time my troops were ordered to Greensborough General Sherman’s troops did not occupy that part of North Carolina. It was occupied by the enemy, and consequently within my command, as defined by General Orders, Numbers 71, of the War Department. But whether or not Greensborough, or any part of North Carolina, was in my command, General Sherman’s remarks are equally without justification. On the 22nd of April Lieutenant-General Grant notified me that Sherman’s arrangements had been disapproved and orders given to resume hostilities and directed me to move my troops on Danville and Greensborough, precisely as I did move them, there to await his further orders. My instructions to Generals Meade, Sheridan, and Wright were just such instructions as General Grant had directed me to give. The offense, or whatever he may please to call it, if any there was, of marching my troops within territory claimed by General Sherman, was not mine, but General Grant’s, and all the which he has directed upon me for that act must fall upon the general-in-chief.

Second. General Sherman charges that by marching my troops into North Carolina I violated his truce, which he was bound to enforce even at the cost of many lives by a collision of our respective armies. General Sherman had never sent me his truce. I had never seen it and did not know its terms or conditions. I only knew that his truce or “arrangement”, whatever it was, had been disapproved and set aside by the President, and General Grant, in ordering the movement of my troops, simply notified me of this fact and of the renewal of hostilities. Even if Sherman’s truce had been binding on me, which if was not, I had no knowledge of the clause relating to forty-eight hours’ notice. It is strange that he should seek to bind me by conditions of the existence of which I was ignorant, and he had taken no measures to inform me. But even had I know them I could not have acted otherwise than I did. I simply carried out the orders of my superior officer, who had seen the truce and knew its terms. If General Sherman was, under the circumstances, justified in stopping the movements of my troops, even by destroying the commands of General Sheridan and General Wright, the responsibility of this sacrifice of human life must have rested either upon General Sherman or upon General Grant, for I simply obeyed the orders of the latter in regard to these movements.

General Sherman reflects on me for not going in person to violate, as he is pleased to call it, a truce which he “was bound in honor to defend and maintain,” “even at the cost of many lives”, and upon the marching powers of the troops which I sent into North Carolina. In reply to this I can only say that I was not ordered to go with these troops, but to send them under their commanders to certain points, there to await further orders from Lieutenant-General Grant, precisely as I directed. The troops were mostly selected by General Grant, not by me, and as he had commanded them for a year he probably knew something of their capacity for marching and whether or not they would march their legs off “to catch the treasure for their own use. ”

Third. Again, General Sherman complains that my orders of April 26, to push forward against Johnston’s army, were given at the very time I knew that that army was surrendering to him.

In making this statement ho forgets time and circumstances. He must have known that I did not have and could not possibly have had at that time any official information of any new arrangements between him and Johnston for the surrender of the latter’s army. Neither General Sherman nor any one else could have sent me such official information otherwise than by sea, which would have required several days. I only knew from General Grant that Sherman’s “arrangements” had been disapproved, that orders had been given to resume hostilities, and that I was directed by him to push forward my troops to Greensborough, where they would receive further orders. All other information from North Carolina came from rebel sources.

Fourth. The burden of General Sherman’s complaint on this subject is that I ordered Generals Sheridan and Wright to push forward their troops as directed by General Grant, “regardless of any orders from any one except General Grant”. This was simply carrying out the spirit of my instructions from General Grant. He had notified me that orders had been given to resume hostilities, and had directed me to send certain troops to Greensborough to await his further orders. As these troops approached the boundaries of North Carolina, Johnston, Beauregard, and other rebel officers tried, on the alleged grounds of arrangements with Sherman, to stop the movements ordered by General Grant. When informed of this I directed my officers to execute the commands which General Grant had given to me, regardless of orders of Grant himself. I respectfully submit that I could not have done less without neglecting my duty.

Fifth. General Sherman sneers at any sending troops from the direction of Burkeville and Danville against Davis in North Carolina, as “hardy worthy of” my “military education and genius.” However ridiculous General Sherman may consider these movements, they were made precisely as General Grant had directed them.

Sixth. He complains that I did not notify him in regard to Davis and his stolen treasure. For the reason that I had no communication open to him. My most direct way of communication with him was through the Department at Washington, and I sent all information to the Department as soon as it was received.
However “absurd” General Sherman may have considered the information, it was given by some of the most respectable and reliable business men in Richmond through a gentleman whose character and position would prevent me from pronouncing his statements “absurd”, and of saying, without examination, “I don’t believe a word of the treasure story.”

Seventh. In order to sustain his position that the movements of my troops, ordered by General Grant, were in violation of his truce which I was bound to observe even without knowing its terms, and that he would have been justified to resist “even at the cost of many lives”, General Sherman refers to a chapter of International Law. His reference is most pointedly against his positions and doctrines, and the case given in illustration in Section 4 was one of which General Sherman was personally cognizant. In that case a subordinate commander refused to be bound a truce of his superior commanding another department. General Sherman was not even my superior. I contend that all my orders were justifiable by the laws of war and military usage, even if they had not been directed by superior authority.

Eighth. General Sherman says that General Grant “reached in time to countermand General Halleck’s orders and prevent his violating my truce”. This is not true. General Grant neither disapproved nor countermanded any orders of mine, nor was there at that time any truce. It had ceased by General Grant’s orders to resume hostilities, and the subsequent surrender of Johnston’s army, of which he then notified me, and recalled a part of the troops which he had directed me to send to Danville and Greensborough.

Ninth. There is but one other point in General Sherman’s official* complaint that I deem it necessary to notice. I refer to the suggestion made to you in regard to orders to Generals Thomas and Wilson for preventing the escape of Davis and his cabinet. Although these officers were the nominal command of General Sherman, yet after he left Altana they received their instructions and orders from yourself and General Grant direct, not through General Sherman. This is recognized and provided for by the regulations of the War Department and has been practiced for years. I have transmitted hundreds of orders in this way and General Sherman was cognizant of the fact. The movements of General Thomas, Stoneman, Wilson, A. J. Smith, &c., while within General Sherman’s general command have been directed in this way for more that six months. In suggesting the orders be sent to these officers directly, and not through General Sherman, I suggested no departure from well-established official channels; but even if I had the responsibility of adopting that course must rest upon the authority who sent the orders. if his complaint is directed against the from of the suggestion, I can only say that I was innocent of any intended offense. My telegram was hurriedly written, intended for yourself, not the public, and had reference to the state of facts as reported to me. It was reported that orders purporting to come from General Sherman had been received through rebel lines of General Wilson to withdraw from Macon, release his prisoners, and that all hostilities should cease. These orders threw open the door for the escape of Davis and his party. This I knew was contradictory to the wishes and orders of the Government, but I had no means of knowing whether or not Sherman had been so informed. I at the time had no communication with or with General Grant, and I was not aware that either could communicate with our officers in the West except through rebel authorities, who of course could not be relied on. I repeat that my suggestion had reference only to the facts and wishes of the Government as known to me at the time, and was intended in no respect to reflect upon or be disrespectful to General Sherman. If I had been able to communicate with General Sherman, or had know at the time the condition of affairs in North Carolina, there would have been no necessary or occasion for any suggestion to you, and most probably none would have been made. With these remarks I respectfully submit that General Sherman’s report, so far as he refers to me, is unjust, unkind, and contrary to military usage, and that his statements are contrary to the real facts of the case. I beg leave further to remark that I have in no way, shape, or manner criticized or reflected upon General Sherman’s course in North Carolina, or upon his truce, or, as General Grant styles it, “arrangement” with Johnston and Breckinridge, but have simply acted upon the orders, instructions, and expressed wishes of my superiors as communicated to me and as I understood them.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
H. W. HALLECK, Major-General

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Tuesday, June 6, 1865

On leave with my family.

My thoughts on the war:

For the rapid transmission of orders in an army covering a large space of ground, the magnetic telegraph is by far the best, though habitually the paper and pencil, with good mounted orderlies, answer every purpose. I have little faith in the signal-service by flags and torches, though we always used them; because, almost invariably when they were most needed, the view was cut off by intervening trees, or by mists and fogs. There was one notable instance in my experience, when the signal-flags carried a message of vital importance over the heads of Hood’s army, which had interposed between me and Allatoona, and had broken the telegraph-wires. But the value of the magnetic telegraph in war cannot be exaggerated, as was illustrated by the perfect concert of action between the armies in Virginia and Georgia during 1864. Hardly a day intervened when General Grant did not know the exact state of facts with me, more than fifteen hundred miles away as the wires ran. So on the field, a thin insulated wire may be run on improvised stakes or from tree to tree for six or more miles in a couple of hours, and I have seen operators so skillful, that by cutting the wire they would receive a message with their tongues from a distant station. As a matter of course, the ordinary commercial wires along the railways form the usual telegraph-lines for an army, and these are easily repaired and extended as the army advances, but each army and wing should have a small party of skilled men to put up the field-wire, and take it down when done. This is far better than the signal-flags and torches. Our commercial telegraph-lines will always supply for war enough skillful operators.

The value of railways is also fully recognized in war quite as much as, if not more so than, in peace. The Atlanta campaign would simply have been impossible without the use of the railroads from Louisville to Nashville–one hundred and eighty-five miles– from Nashville to Chattanooga–one hundred and fifty-one miles–and from Chattanooga to Atlanta–one hundred and thirty-seven miles. Every mile of this “single track” was so delicate, that one man could in a minute have broken or moved a rail, but our trains usually carried along the tools and means to repair such a break. We had, however, to maintain strong guards and garrisons at each important bridge or trestle–the destruction of which would have necessitated time for rebuilding.

For the protection of a bridge, one or two log block houses, two stories high, with a piece of ordnance and a small infantry guard, usually sufficed. The block-house had a small parapet and ditch about it, and the roof was made shot proof by earth piled on. These points could usually be reached only by a dash of the enemy’s cavalry, and many of these block houses successfully resisted serious attacks by both cavalry and artillery. The only block-house that was actually captured on the main was one near Allatoona.

Our trains from Nashville forward were operated under military rules, and ran about ten miles an hour in gangs of four trains of ten cars each. Four such groups of trains daily made one hundred and sixty cars, of ten tons each, carrying sixteen hundred tons, which exceeded the absolute necessity of the army, and allowed for the accidents that were common and inevitable. But, as I have recorded, that single stem of railroad, four hundred and seventy-three miles long, supplied an army of one hundred thousand men and thirty-five thousand animals for the period of one hundred and ninety-six days, viz., from May 1 to November 12, 1864. To have delivered regularly that amount of food and forage by ordinary wagons would have required thirty-six thousand eight hundred wagons of six mules each, allowing each wagon to have hauled two tons twenty miles each day, a simple impossibility in roads such as then existed in that region of country. Therefore, I reiterate that the Atlanta campaign was an impossibility without these railroads; and only then, because we had the men and means to maintain and defend them, in addition to what were necessary to overcome the enemy.

Habitually, a passenger-car will carry fifty men with their necessary baggage. Box-cars, and even platform-cars, answer the purpose well enough, but they, should always have rough board-seats. For sick and wounded men, box-cars filled with straw or bushes were usually employed. Personally, I saw but little of the practical working of the railroads, for I only turned back once as far as Resaca; but I had daily reports from the engineer in charge, and officers who came from the rear often explained to me the whole thing, with a description of the wrecked trains all the way from Nashville to Atlanta. I am convinced that the risk to life to the engineers and men on that railroad fully equaled that on the skirmish-line, called for as high an order of courage, and fully equaled it in importance. Still, I doubt if there be any necessity in time of peace to organize a corps specially to work the military railroads in time of war, because in peace these same men gain all the necessary experience, possess all the daring and courage of soldiers, and only need the occasional protection and assistance of the necessary train-guard, which may be composed of the furloughed men coming and going, or of details made from the local garrisons to the rear.

For the transfer of large armies by rail, from one theatre of action to another by the rear–the cases of the transfer of the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps–General Hooker, twenty-three thousand men–from the East to Chattanooga, eleven hundred and ninety- two miles in seven days, in the fall of 1863; and that of the Army of the Ohio–General Schofield, fifteen thousand men–from the valley of the Tennessee to Washington, fourteen hundred miles in eleven days, en route to North Carolina in January, 1865, are the best examples of which I have any knowledge.

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Monday, June 5, 1865

On leave with my family:

My thoughts on the war:
In camp, and especially in the presence of an active enemy, it is much easier to maintain discipline than in barracks in time of peace. Crime and breaches of discipline are much less frequent, and the necessity for courts-martial far less. The captain can usually inflict all the punishment necessary, and the colonel should always. The field-officers’ court is the best form for war, viz., one of the field-officers-the lieutenant- colonel or major –can examine the case and report his verdict, and the colonel should execute it. Of course, there are statutory offenses which demand a general court-martial, and these must be ordered by the division or corps commander; but, the presence of one of our regular civilian judge-advocates in an army in the field would be a first-class nuisance, for technical courts always work mischief. Too many courts-martial in any command are evidence of poor discipline and inefficient officers.

On a road, marching by the flank, it would be considered “good order” to have five thousand men to a mile, so that a full corps of thirty thousand men would extend six miles, but with the average trains and batteries of artillery the probabilities are that it would draw out to ten miles. On a long and regular march the divisions and brigades should alternate in the lead, the leading division should be on the road by the earliest dawn, and march at the rate of about two miles, or, at most, two and a half miles an hour, so as to reach camp by noon. Even then the rear divisions and trains will hardly reach camp much before night. Theoretically, a marching column should preserve such order that by simply halting and facing to the right or left, it would be in line of battle; but this is rarely the case, and generally deployments are made “forward,” by conducting each brigade by the flank obliquely to the right or left to its approximate position in line of battle, and there deployed. In such a line of battle, a brigade of three thousand infantry would occupy a mile of “front;” but for a strong line of battle five-thousand men with two batteries should be allowed to each mile, or a division would habitually constitute a double line with skirmishers and a reserve on a mile of “front.”

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