Smyrna Camp-Ground, North of Atlanta
SMYRNA CAMP-GROUND, October 4, 1864
Tomorrow I will concentrate the whole army at Kenesaw and move upon the enemy wherever he may be. Howard is here and Cox is at the river. Instruct Elliot, if you can communicate with him, to harass as much as possible the corps burning the railroad, and build fires as indications of a large force about Kenesaw. Hood left a considerable force down about Campbellton, and has with him doubtess the best part of his three corps. Howard and Davis will come up on the Marietta and Sandtown road.
Make a feint on Pine Mountain in the morning with a view to prevent an attack on Allatoona, which I wish to avoid. My opinion is they don’t want to fight, but want to interrupt our communication.
W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General
General Stanley asked about Elliot and moving to Kenesaw:
I heard from General Elliot last night. He was on the Sandtown and Allatoona road, and reported he would push for Dallas today. Hood is reported with infantry at Powder Springs and Dallas; his cavalry upon our road above Marietta. I will be up today and move to Kenesaw. Cox and Howard moved at dayLight, and will reach Smyrna tonight. Send word to Vandever to move his force to Kenesaw, leaving a picket in Marietta.
Yes, move to Little Kenesaw and WEST of it, taking a strong position. If you can communicate with Elliot tell him in my name to interpose with his whole cavalry force between Dallas and Allatoona and strike toward any force in the direction of Acworth. General Howard is here and General Cox expected every moment. I will push them forward to night to Smyrna Camp. Leave a small brigade there until Howard or Cox arrives to cover your trains and keep communication. I will either be at Smyrna or Marietta tonight.
Stanley arrived at 3:30 p. m. and has camped in the old rebel works in the vicinity and south of Little Kenesaw. From top of the mountain he can see the rebel troops burning the road, all of which has been reported from other sources. Prisoners sent in by General Elliott report that they still have six days’ rations. The say Stewart’s corps is burning the road and Hardee’s and Lee’s corps are in the vicinity of Pine Mountain.
Jeff Davis Writes:
I arrived at the crossing last evening at dark; was only able to put one DIVISION across during the night. My troops and ammunition are all over and encamped on the road leading to Nickajack. This road leads through the rebel works at Nickajack and runs from there into the Marietta road. I have just returned from General Stanley’s headquarters. He is moving for Little Kenesaw and advised me to move on this road to that point. My supply train is still on the other side, of the river and rations are due the troops tomorrow night. Should I move without it I should fear it s coming up. Please report this information to the general commanding.
I want your DIVISION up toward Marietta, joining on to General Stanley on his left. Your trains will be safe, for Kilpatrick is off to your left. Still you whould leave a guard with them. Howard’s troops are now passing up to Smyrna. I want as strong a force up to the left of Kenesaw as possible to-night. Hood is at Dallas; his cavalry is on our road and Elliot is after them.
HDQRS. MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, In the Field, Smyrna Camp-Ground
General SLOCUM, Atlanta:
I have reason to believe Wheeler is on our road above Resaca. Hood’s main army is between me and Allatoona. I shall attack the latter in force, but advise you to work night and day in perfecting those intrenchents and in economizing provision, but if I live you may count upon my coming to your rescue. The point of greatest danger is the bridge, therefore look to it. Please answer.
W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General, Commanding
We are hand at work, and I think you need have no anxiety about us. The bridge is perfectly safe.
KENESAW MOUNTAIN, October 4, 1864.
General CORSE, Rome:
Sherman directs you to move forward and join Smith’s DIVISION with your entire command, using cars, if to be had, and burn provisions rather than lose them.
ROME, October 4, 1864.
Brigadier General J. E. SMITH:
Your telegram of 2nd instant just received. My latest information is that a large force is moving on Alltoona. In accordance with General Sherman’s instructions, I will move my entire command to Cartersville and unite with General Raum in attacking the enemy from Allatoona direct.
J. M. CORSE, Brigadier-General
I am told that a large force of the enemy is hard at work burning the railroad both sides Big Shanty.
This message was sent to COMMANDING OFFICER, Allatoona:
Sherman is moving in force. Hold out.
Grant will send General Wilson to lead the cavalry. This is welcome news.
Governor Morton Complains; Secretary Stanton Writes:
WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington, October 4, 1864: 7:36 p. m.
Major-General SHERMAN, Atlanta:
Governor Morton informs this Departmnet that you have closed the office of the Indiana State Agency Sanitary Commission, and turned over its property to the United States Sanitary Commission. You will please report the reason for the proceeding. The State agencies have generally been found efficient, trustworthy, and entitled to protection, and for this reason the hostility of the United States Commission to them has not been favored.
EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War
Grant Replies to Halleck about war plans:
CONFIDENTIAL: HDQRS. ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES, City Point, Va., October 4, 1864.
Major General H. W. HALLECK, Chief of Staff of the Army, Washington, D. C.:
Your letter of the 2nd instant, in relation to the movements of the Western armies, and the preparation ordered by the staff officers of General Canby, is received. When this campaign was commenced, nothing else was in contenplation but that Sherman, after capturing Atlanta, should connect with Canby at Mobile. Drawing the Nineteenth Corps, however, from Canby, and the movements of Kirby Smith demanding the presence of all of Canby’s surplus forces in another direction, have made it impossible to carry out the plan as early as was contemplated. Any considerable force to co-operate with Sherman on the sea-coast must now be sent from here. The question is whether, under such circumstances, Augusta and Savannah would not be a better line, thatn Selma, Montgomery, and Mobile. I think Savannah might be taken by surprise with one corps from here and such troops as Foster could spare from the Department of the South. This is my view, but before giving positive orders I want to make a visit to Washington and consult a little on the subject.
All Canby can do with his present force is to make demonstration on Mobile and up the Appalachicola toward Columbus. He cannot possibly have the force to require the transportation your letters would indicate he has called for, or to consume the supplies. Either line indicated would cut off the supplies from the rich district of Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi equally well. Whichever way Sherman moves he will undoubtedly encounter Hood’s army, and in crossing to the sea-coast will sever the connection between Lee’s army and this district of country. I wrote to Sherman on this subject, sending my letter by a staff officer. He is ready to attempt (and feels confident of his ability to succeed) to make his way to either the Savannah River or any of the navigable steams emptying into the Atlantic or Gulf, if he is only certain of finding a base open for him when he arrives. The supplies Canby was ordering I presume were intended for the use of Sherman’s army. I do not deem it necessary to accumulate them in any great quantity until the base to which he is to make his way is secured.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General