Sunday, May 29, 1864

Near Dallas, Georgia May 29, 1864: 7.30 a.m.

Major General H. W. HALLECK, Washington, D. C.:

Yesterday we pressed our lines up in close contact with the enemy, who has covered his whole front with breast-works of timber and earth. With the intention of working to my left, toward the railroad, east of Allatoona, I ordered General McPherson, who is in advance of Dallas and forms my right, to send his trains to a point on Pumpkin Vine Creek about four miles north of his present position, and to withdraw his army and take Thomas’ present position, while all of General Thomas’ and General Schofield’s armies will be moved farther to the east, working around the enemy to the left. the enemy, who had observed the movement of the trains from his higher position, massed against General McPherson and attacked him at 4.30 p.m. yesterday, but was repulsed with great slaughter and at little cost to us. The enemy fled back to his breast-works on the ridge, leaving in our hands his dead and wounded. Loss, 2,500 and about 300 prisoners. General McPherson’s men being covered by log breast-works, like our old Corinth lines, were comparatively unhurt, his loss being not over 300 in all.

I give him today to gather in the wounded and bury the dead of the both sides, and tonight and tomorrow will endeavor to gain ground to our left three of four miles. General Blair is now supposed to be near Rome. I will order him to march straight for Allatoona, which I infer the enemy has abandoned altogether, or left in the hands of militia. That point gained, I will move to the left and resume railroad communications to the rear. I have no doubt Johnston has in my front every man he can scrape, and Mobile must now be at our mercy, if General Canby and General Banks could send to Pascagoula 10,000 men.

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General

I asked McPherson to order Blair’s movement:

HDQRS. MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, In the Field, May 29, 1864

General McPHERSON, Commanding Army of the Tennessee:
I suppose General Blair to be now near Rome. I wish you to send a good staff officer to meet him there or at Kingston and order him to replenish his stores and march for Allatoona Pass, east of the Etowah, to gain, if possible, its eastern terminus and then intrench his position. He had better march from Kingston four miles southeast to the Free Bridge, cross the Etowah, and move for Allatoona, via Euharlee and Stilesborough. This route will deceive the enemy as to his purposes till the latest moment possible. Once in possession of Allatoona, I wish him to order the railroad superintendent, who is already at Resaca, to repair the railroad up to Allatoona, including the Etowah or Hightower bridge. General Blair should also construct on the dirt road a trestle bridge at the same crossing.

I am, with great respect, yours, truly,
W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General, Commanding

There is a rumor that some militia are available. I want them to guard the railroad.

HDQRS. MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, 
In the Field, Near Dallas, May 29, 1864
General WEBSTER, Nashville, Tennessee:

General Rousseau reports that some one in Kentucky is stopping for duty there the 100 days’ militia. Inquire into the truth, and see that 5,000 of the first militia go to Nashville and along the road to the Tennessee River. General McPherson’s command at Decatur and Huntsville must be relieved and sent forward according to existing orders. We have had many sharp and serious encounters, but nothing decisive yet. We confront the enemy about fifteen miles southwest of Marietta in front of Dallas. All well.
W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General, Commanding

General Thomas sends me a recommendation for troop movement to our left:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Near Dallas, Ga., May 29, 1864: 2 p.m.

Major-General SHERMAN:
I have just returned from the lines, commencing at Brown’s Mill and extending to McCook’s headquarters on the Burnt Hickory and Marietta road. As far as I can ascertain from personal observation, and from the reports of officers, we have decidedly the advantage of the enemy in artillery positions on either side of Pettit’s Creek. One on the south side of Pettit’s Creek near Pettit’s Mill, and two on the north side nearly on a line north and south from the first-named hill; all three within good cannon-range of the Dallas and Acworth road, and from which a concentrated fire can be had on the point which is considered the extreme right of the enemy’s intrenchments (namely Leverett’s house). On the north side of Pettit’s Creek in an easterly direction the country is comparatively open as far as I could see, and can be easily passed over by infantry and artillery. It is my opinion that a strong flank movement on that road will be perfectly successful. To reach the hills above alluded to the troops will have to march a distance of five or six miles, one-half the way over a common road, which will cause some delay. For that reason I would suggest that the troops take up their position late in the afternoon of the day previous to the attack on the Acworth road, rather than to attempt to accomplish the whole thing in one day. The route is entirely concealed from the sight of the enemy as the road is covered all the way by hills and woods.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
GEO. H. THOMAS, Major-General U. S. Volunteers, Commanding.

Schofield is reporting heavy skirmishing in his front on the left of our line. It is imperative that he hold that position.
We now have a number of empty supply wagons. I propose that we make all the wagons from the 3 armies into a single train, send the sick and wounded to the rear under heavy guard and use the wagons to bring up more supplies.

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